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As far as bilateral relations between the United
Kingdom and Croatia are concerned, one should con-
centrate on the present and on the future. Indeed, the
history of relations between the United Kingdom and
Croatia casts quite a long shadow over our
endeavours to understand each other better today.
As for the past, it is not very useful to discuss
the UK's role in the creation of the first Yugoslavia.
Two events should be menitoned which, still cast a
shadow on bilateral relationship. The first is the Brit-
ish role in the repatriation of Croats, Slovenes and
Serbs from Carinthia in 1945. And the second is the
circumstances of the recognition of Croatia when
Yugoslavia disintegrated. The main point is that there
is absolutely no truth what-
soever in the claim that the
British authorities, civil and
military, deliberately sent
people back to Yugoslavia,
soldiers and civilians alike,
in the knowledge that they
would be massacred by
Tito's partisan forces. There
was no conspiracy between
British and Tito's forces to
this effect. There were no at-
tacks by British soldiers at
B leiburg on defenceless
Croatians. It is very impor-
tant for a new nation such
as Croatia not to build up a
national identity based on a
misunderstanding of history,
perceived past injustice and
discrimination. This is all
the more important in the
case of Croatia, where belief
in British hostility to Croats
is combined with belief in
some sort of instinctive ata-
vistic sympathy for Serbs.
Why then British
caution over the recognition
of Croatia? Was not this in
accordance with the principle of self-determination?
The key relevant principle in the Helsinki final act is
that frontiers can be changed peacefully and by agree-
ment. This is the principle on which the reunification
of Germany was based.
In any event, British perspective was that the
dissolution of Yugoslavia might not be achieved
peacefully. Therefore some form of confederal
reorganisation seemed to be a worthwhile goal. In
the event that proved to be impossible and UK ac-
cepted that recognition was the right course. Two
key points flow from this. The first is that British
hesitation over recognition was in no sense animated
by anti-Croatian conspiratorial motives designed to
maintain some sort of Brit-
ish sphere of influence in
South East Europe 19th cen-
tury style. The second is that
once UK had recognised
Croatia, that became the
sole basis of British policy.
It is no part of British policy
whatsoever to recreate the
past. The basis of the rela-
tionship between the United
Kingdom and Croatia now
is one between two sover-
eign independent states. It is
however very important that
countries which aspire to
join the European Union
should live in peace and har-
mony with neighbours, who
have the same legitimate as-
piration. It is necessary to
foster the development of
liberal democracy, a social
market economy, and soci-
ety based on the rule of law
throughout Europe. These
are the essential precondi-
tions ofEU membership for
any country.
The United Kingdom has played a
significant role in the political
development of Croatia on several
occasions since 1919. In respect to
the question of Croatian
independence in the 1990s British,
apparently hesitating attitude, was
due to the Helsinki act principles of
peaceful change and not a
consequence of anti-Croatian
motives. The change in the British
policy towards Croatia and its
subsequent recognition occurred as
an effect of a changed situation and
realisation that a peaceful
reconstruction of Yugoslavia is no
longer possible. The current British
policy is supportive of the Croatian
aspiration to join the Western
integrations for which it would be
necessary for Croatia to adopt a
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United Kingdom Presidency
of the European Union*
British diplomacy is not in the least shy
about acknowledging that British foreign policy
is about the promotion of British interests. There
is no British interest in creating in this part of
the world a 19th century balance of power. Brit-
ish interests are the maintenance of the security
and prosperity of the United Kingdom. Since
1949 the cornerstone of British security has been
the NATO alliance. As far as prosperity and, in-
creasingly, security are concerned, the key insti-
tution is the European Union. The greater pro-
portion of UK trade is with EU partners. If one
includes the associates and other European pro-
spective members, the proportion is even greater
still.
The fundamental lesson for British inter-
ests which was learned from two world wars is
that the exclusion and isolation of defeated en-
emies, especially inherently powerful ones such
as Germany, is a mistake. Exclusion, punitive
reparations and the like lead to a desire for re-
venge, a widespread sense of injustice, and all
the dangers of revisionism.
We believe profoundly that we made a mis-
take in 1919 but that we got it right after 1945.
Including (initially of course West) Germany in
the Council of Europe, the WEU, NATO and the
European Union transformed the country which,
from British point of view, had been a factor of
instability in Europe since the late 19th century,
into a major factor for stability. Soviet Union was
initially opposed to the inclusion of the GDR in
NATO. I vividly remember Soviet diplomats tell-
ing me that for their Generals this would mean
that the Soviet Union had lost the Second World
War after all. One ofthe factors which persuaded
the Russians to change their minds was the strong
representations made to them by countries, such
as Poland and Hungary in particular, that leav-
ing the security status of the GDR uncertain
would create an unstable loose cannon on the
deck of Central Europe, storing up trouble for
the future. Inclusion of East Germany within
NATO on the condition that East Germany was
governed by the democratic state based on the
* This article was prepared in the first half of 1998 while UK
chaired the UE.
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rule of law established in the Federal Republic
would be their best guarantee of future security.
Experience since 1990 shows that this was the
correct judgement. This was the reverse of the
zero sum game mentality which sometimes pre-
vails in this part of the world: bad for my
neighbour equals good for me.
This is the background to Presidency of the
EU which the UK exercised last in the second
half of 1992. Let me set out briefly what our Presi-
dency priorities now are. First of all the need ,
and this is important also in domestic political
terms, to demonstrate a more positive attitude
towards all aspects of EU business. We are at-
taching high priority to economic reform of the
EU, to boosting employment prospects, growth
and competitiveness. We have signed up to the
social chapter and have developed a clear effec-
tive and positive approach to European Monetary
Union. If and when it is in the British interests to
do so, we shall join. Our objectives for the pe-
riod ahead include a more effective Common For-
eign and Security Policy in which the UK is
recognised to be a leader. In particular, UK aims
to pursue successful negotiations for the next
stage of enlargement. In this context the agenda
for internal reform is extremely important for the
EU's external relations. To take but the most
obvious example. If a country such as Poland
were to join the EU under the existing CAP,
spending on agriculture would spiral out of con-
trol to politically unacceptable levels. Indeed,
present levels of subsidy to inefficient agricul-
ture are a matter of sharp domestic controversy
in the UK. So when you think from time to time,
as perhaps you do, that we are paying insuffi-
ciently urgent attention to enlargement, bear in
mind this internal agenda.
What then are the problems as far as the
UK is concerned? The first one is this. The Eu-
ropean Union has been, since the beginning, a
political project designed to bury conflict forever
between the nations of Europe. It used, initially
at least, economic means such as the coal and
steel community. The economic means, it was
foreseen by visionaries such as Jean Monnet ,
would make the project palatable in countries
such as France and the Netherlands where bitter
memories from the war would have sunk a purely
political project. One can recall that the French
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parliament rejected in 1954 proposals for a Eu-
ropean defence community including Germany.
In Britain which had not been occupied and where
there was and is justified pride in its wartime role
the political picture was different. UK kept the
distance from the European Community with
seriously adverse economic, political and social
results. Then it was sold to the British people in
the main as a matter of commercial self-interest.
Edward Heath was one of the very few post-war
leaders to explain honestly the political nature
of the project. These problems persisted through-
out the 1970s and 80s, resulting in the divisions
in the Conservative Party. It seems that the new
British Government is the first which has not
taken office, burdened by an internal quarrel over
the place of the UK in Europe. The UK has greater
room for manoeuvre and greater authority in the
EU than in its previous Presidencies in 1992 and
1986. It also helps a great deal of course that the
economic outlook in the UK is good. Unemploy-
ment is lower than in France or Germany for ex-
ample.
European Union and Croatia
This then is the background to the relation-
ship between the European Union and Croatia
from the British perspective. The British Gov-
ernment is committed to the UK's membership
of the EU and is in agreement with partners about
the priority to be attached to enlargement. We
also agree with our partners that Croatia like other
countries covered by the Regional Approach has
a legitimate aspiration to membership, and, a key
point about the Regional Approach: Croatia will
itself determine the pace of its progress. In no
sense will Croatia be held back by other coun-
tries, although if by its own actions, in relation
to Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia indicates, let us
say that it is striving for a relationship with the
Federation that is incompatible with Dayton, this
in turn would hold up the development of
Croatia's relationship with the EU.
What then is the problem? Is it international
pressure? Why is Croatia not yet in the same po-
sition as Slovenia? There is no need to say too
much about the economic aspects. Notwithstand-
ing the economic difficulties, there is no doubt
137
that if the political difficulties could be solved,
Croatia could quickly have access to the PHARE
programme restored, and a new mandate for ne-
gotiations on a trade and co-operation agreement
could be agreed. Associate status would follow,
as would then an invitation to begin negotiations
for membership itself.
But Croatia accepted a number of obliga-
tions when it joined the Council of Europe in
relation to human rights, democracy, the rule of
law, the free media, and indeed the protection of
members of national minorities. It also accepted
a number of obligations when it signed the Erdut
and Dayton peace agreements. These take pre-
cedence over domestic legislation. We have
ample experience ofthis in Britain because many
cases have gone to Strasbourg.
What the EU is essentially asking Croatia
to do is to implement international agreements
into which it entered freely. Editorial indepen-
dence for the electronic media TV is particularly
relevant. Establishing a framework for it would
not be costly. Given the importance which poli-
ticians everywhere attach to the media, this is a
step which could be taken quickly and which
would immediately command favourable atten-
tion. Even if Croatia's arrangements are inspired
by models elsewhere, e.g. in countries such as
Austria, Germany and Belgium, the results are
not the same in Croatia.
Particular attention should be paid to the
question of the return of refugees and displaced
persons. The international community will not
accept the proposition that the Serbs who left dur-
ing Operations Storm and Flash are all rebels
who, on departure, renounced their citizenship.
All of us recognise how difficult and painful this
is, and how costly. But there is simply too much
evidence that discrimination on ethnic grounds,
and not cost, is the problem. It is relevant to quote
the example of a Serb who wishes to return to
his home who has confirmation from the Croatian
authorities that he has every right to do so. All
his paperwork is in order but his house is being
occupied by a Croat who has recently returned
after living in Switzerland since 1970. It has been
made clear to this refugee that the only way
through the logjam is to pay handsome bribes.
There can be no lasting peace and security in this
region unless and until there is a sincere serious
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and effective effort to tackle the problem of refu-
gees and displaced persons, and a genuine effort
to banish corruption and discrimination. That is
what the EU means by its calls on Croatia to make
its own positive contribution.
Croatia and Bosnian
Federation
The relationship between Croatia and the
Bosnian Federation presents particular problems
for Croatia's aspirations for a closer relationship
with the ED. On the one hand, we hear that
Croatia is a Central European and Mediterranean
country which is constitutionally committed not
to entering into any Balkan associations. Where
one would ask does this leave Croatia's relations
with Greece, a Balkan country which is already
a member of the EU? On the other hand, Croatia's
initial proposals for special relations with the
Bosnian Federation would have involved a cus-
toms and even a monetary union with part of a
sovereign state. The latest proposals are much
better. But in any event, it has seemed as if
Croatian policy is facing in mutually exclusive
directions. On the one hand, the strategic goal of
Euro-Atlantic integration; on the other hand a re-
lationship with a neighbour which is incompat-
ible with that goal; and again domestic arrange-
ments which in terms of implementation fall short
of obligations already entered into as a member
of the Council of Europe. So this was what For-
eign Ministers Kinkel and Vedrine meant when
they said that Croatia had the key to European
integration in its own hands. One might be added
that the position as regards Croatia's prospects
for partnership for peace and NATO are basically
the same as those in relation to the European
Union.
To concluded with a word about leadership.
After the Second World War, Monnet, Adenauer,
de Gaulle, de Gasperi, Truman, Marshall and in-
deed Churchill all saw, far ahead of the embit-
tered refugees and others who had suffered so
much during the war, that even if they could nei-
ther forget nor yet forgive, the peoples of this
small continent would have to live together as
good neighbours. They took decisions that would
not have been popular with the voters if they had
been put to a referendum. That is why, for ex-
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ample, Milosevic's latest ploy of a referendum
on 23 April on Kosovo is so hopelessly irrespon-
sible. De Gaulle had to employ a number of strata-
gems which might even have seemed unworthy
to cut the gordian knot of France's role in Alge-
ria. Is there a parallel here between France and
Algeria, and Croatia and Herzegovina? De Gaulle
saw that France could not at one and the same
time become a modem European democratic state
and remain entangled in Algeria, with French
domestic policy effectively determined by the
French community in that territory.
More recently the leadership of O'Heme
and Tony Blair - is it not striking that John Ma-
jor has joined forces with Tony Blair to advocate
support for the new agreement on Northern Ire-
land - may produce a settlement acceptable to a
majority on both sides of the divide, albeit for
fundamentally different reasons. We hoped both
in Britain and in Ireland that our joint member-
ship of the European Union would enable this
historic division, every bit as acute and in some
ways similar to the divisions which exist in this
part of the world, to be overcome.
The question for Croatia therefore is
whether "a nation forged in war" and a winner
and which has achieved very significant suc-
cesses in terms of nation building and of the
economy can now go further, implement a lib-
eral democracy, and make a contribution to sta-
bility and reconciliation in this part of the world
in line not only with its obligations but also with
the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of
its people. •
